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Abstract
Episodes of sovereign default feature three key empirical regularities in connection with
the banking systems of the countries where they occur: (i) sovereign defaults and banking
crises tend to happen together, (ii) commercial banks have substantial holdings of gov-
ernment debt, and (iii) sovereign defaults result in major contractions in bank credit and
production. This paper provides a rationale for these phenomena by extending the tradi-
tional sovereign default framework to incorporate bankers that lend to both the government
and the corporate sector. When these bankers are highly exposed to government debt a
default triggers a banking crisis which leads to a corporate credit collapse and subsequently
to an output decline. When calibrated to Argentina’s 2001 default episode the model pro-
duces default on equilibrium with a frequency in line with actual default frequencies, and
when it happens credit experiences a sharp contraction which generates an output drop
similar in magnitude to the one observed in the data. Moreover, the model also matches
several moments of the cyclical dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates.
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1 Introduction
Sovereign defaults and Banking Crises have been recurrent in emerging economies. Recent default
episodes (e.g. Russia 1998, Argentina 2001) have shown that whenever the sovereign decides to
default on its debt there is an adverse impact on the domestic economy to a large extent through
disruptions to the domestic financial systems. Why does this happen? Both in the Argentine
and Russian experiences (and also in others discussed below) the banking sectors where highly
exposed to government debt. In this way a government default directly decreased the value of
the baking sector’s assets. This forced banks to reduce credit to the domestic economy (a credit
crunch) and in turn generated a decline in economic activity.
The current debt crisis in Europe also highlights the relationship between sovereign defaults,
banking crises and economic activity. Most of the concerns around Greece’s possible default (or
unfavorable restructuring) were related to the level of exposure that banking sectors in Greece
and other European countries had to Greek debt. The concerns were not only on losing what had
been invested in Greek bonds but mostly on how this shock to banks assets would undermine
their lending ability and ultimately the economic activity as a whole.
This leads to the realization that sovereign default episodes can no longer be understood
as events in which the defaulting country suffers mainly from international exclusion and trade
punishments. The motivation above, the empirical evidence presented later on and the policy
discussions (e.g. IMF (2002)) all hint towards shifting the attention to domestic financial sectors
and how they channel the adverse effects of a default to the rest of the economy.
The contribution of this paper is two-folded. Firstly, it presents a theory of the transition
mechanism of sovereign defaults to the banking sector and the rest of the economy. The existing
literature on quantitative models of sovereign defaults has remained silent about the relation-
ship between sovereign debt, default and banking sector performance, this paper fills this gap.
Secondly, on a methodological note, this paper presents a novel mechanism to endogenize the
costs of sovereign defaults: a sovereign default generates a credit crunch, and this credit crunch
generates output declines.
Grounded on three key regularities, namely that (i) defaults and banking crises tend to
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happen together, (ii) banks are highly exposed to government debt, and (iii) crises episodes are
costly in terms of credit and output; we construct a theory that links defaults, banking sector
performance and economic activity. This paper rationalizes these phenomena by extending a
traditional sovereign default framework to incorporate bankers that lend to both the government
and the corporate sector. When these bankers are highly exposed to government debt a default
triggers a banking crisis which leads to a corporate credit collapse and consequently to an output
decline.
These dynamics that characterize a default and a banking crisis are obtained as the optimal
response of a benevolent planner: faced with a level of spending that needs to be financed, and
having only two instruments at hand (i.e. debt and taxes), the planner may find it optimal
to default on his/her debt even at the expense of decreased output and consumption. The
planner balances the costs and benefits of a default: the benefit is the lower taxation needed
to finance spending (lower than would otherwise have been necessary), the cost is the reduced
credit availability and the subsequently decreased output. Quantitative analysis of a version of
the model calibrated to Argentina’s 2001 default yields the following main findings: (1) default
in equilibrium, (2) v-shaped behavior of output and credit around crises episodes, (3) mean
output decline in default episodes of approximately 8%, and (4) overall qualitative behavior of
the model is in line with the business cycle regularities observed in Argentina and other emerging
economies.
Quantitative models of sovereign default have received increased attention since the contri-
butions of Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). These papers extended the seminal
framework of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) to account for business cycle regularities in emerging
economies. A large literature has emerged following this approach and several interesting aspects
of the dynamics of sovereign debt have been studied recently.1 The optimal default decision ex-
amined in most models in this literature comes from weighing the costs and benefits of default.
1Yue (2010) studies debt defaults and renegotiations, D’Erasmo (2011) incorporates government reputation and
endogenous default resolutions, Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) extend the model to incorporate long duration
bonds, Hatchondo et al. (2011) study the effects of debt dilution, among others. Stahler (2011) presents a thorough
account of the recent developments in this literature.
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The majority of the literature has assumed an exogenous cost-of-default structure.2 This paper
proposes a channel to endogenize these costs via the role of government debt in the domestic
credit market.
Mendoza and Yue (forthcoming) were the first to introduce endogenous costs of default.
They assume that a sovereign default not only excludes the government from the international
markets but also prevents the private sector firms from tapping foreign markets. In this way, a
sovereign default forces the productive sector to use less efficient resources and hence generates
an output cost. This paper departs from Mendoza and Yue (forthcoming) in two relevant ways:
first, it presents a model economy flexible enough to accommodate both external and domestic
debt: when debt is at least partially domestically held default is a less attractive option (domestic
residents’ assets become worthless) and therefore makes default-on-equilibrium a more challenging
outcome. Second, it acknowledges the high prevalence of government debt in banks’ balance
sheets and illustrates how a sovereign default diminishes credit availability in the economy.
Other researchers have recently and independently noticed the exposure of the domestic
banking sector to government debt and have asked different questions about this phenomenon.
Gennaioli et al. (2010) construct a stylized model of domestic and external sovereign debt where
domestic debt weakens the balance sheet of banks. This potential damage suffered by the banking
sector represents in itself a ‘signaling’ device that attracts more foreign lenders.3 They understand
the banks’ exposure as a measure of financial institutions quality in the economy and derive
a number of testable implications that they investigate empirically. Our analysis relates to
Gennaioli et al. (2010) in that it also identifies the damage that financial institutions suffer when
defaults come. We identify this reduced credit as the endogenous mechanism generating costs
of defaults and also analyze the benefits side: how distortionary taxation changes when defaults
happens. Additionally we develop a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that is able
to account for a number of empirical regularities in emerging economies.
Bolton and Jeanne (2011) have an interesting paper on sovereign defaults and bank fragility
2See, for example, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011).
3Basu (2009) develops a similar model that features domestic and foreign creditors and where domestic eco-
nomic fragility allows the sovereign to borrow from international markets. Alessandro (2009) presents a related
model in which the sovereign default increases the borrowing costs to domestic firms.
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in a model of contagion between financially integrated economies. With a stylized three-period
model they show that financial integration without fiscal integration may result in an inefficient
(from a global perspective) supply of government debt. This paper relates to them in that both
highlight the exposure of the banking sector to government debt and that sovereign defaults
generate contractions in private credit. We depart from Bolton and Jeanne (2011) in that their
focus is mostly on advance economies and contagion among them, whereas our paper focuses
on emerging economies. This study also differs on the optimal policy treatment of the default
decision and the quantitative analysis of the business cycle behavior of models of sovereign
defaults and banking.4
This paper is also related to the optimal taxation literature. The closest paper to ours in
this literature is Pouzo (2008). He builds on the work of Aiyagari et al. (2002) to analyze the
optimal taxation problem of a planner in a closed economy with defaultable debt. This paper
differs from Pouzo (2008) in three crucial aspects: first, Pouzo (2008) relies on an exogenous
cost of default whereas we propose an endogenous structure; second, Pouzo (2008) restricts the
analysis to a closed economy setting (and therefore to domestic debt) whereas the environment to
be studied here is flexible enough to accommodate both domestic and external debt; and third
(on a more technical note), Pouzo (2008) solves for an equilibrium in which the government
has commitment to a certain tax schedule but not to a repayment policy, whereas our analysis
assumes no commitment on the side of the government.5
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows. Section 2 presents stylized facts
on sovereign defaults, banking crises and output and credit drops. Section 3 lays out the model
and defines the equilibrium. Section 4 contains the numerical solution and the main results of
the paper. Section 5 has a conclusion and describes avenues for future research.
4Yet another related work is the one by Livshits and Schoors (2009). They argue that defaults generate
banking crises because of an inadequate prudential regulation which does not recognize the riskiness of the debt.
5This paper is also related to the literature on optimal public policy without commitment. These papers
solve for Markov-Perfect (and therefore, time-consistent) optimal policies. See Klein et al. (2008) and references
therein.
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Default in period t
Banking Crises in:
t− 2 or t− 1 14 (36%)
t 13 (33%)
t+ 1 or t+ 2 12 (31%)
Table 1: Timing of Defaults and Banking Crises.
2 Stylized Facts
This section documents the stylized facts that motivate the theoretical/quantitative analysis
presented in the rest of the paper. It begins by describing the time clustering of default crises
and banking crises. Then, it examines the exposure of the emerging economies’ banking sectors
to government debt. Finally, it presents the output and credit behavior around default episodes.
Default and Banking crises tend to happen together. We follow Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) classification of banking crises to identify those crises that occurred in the temporal
vicinity of a sovereign default. Of the 82 banking crises episodes documented in Reinhart (2010),
70 were coupled with default crises.6 From those 70 episodes we only consider crises after 1970
(due to data limitations) and we identify those in which the sovereign default either preceded or
coincided with the banking crisis: Table 1 shows that this occurred in 25 out of 39 post 1970
events.7
The relationship between Banking crises and Default episodes has been previously studied
in the empirical literature. In particular, the question of whether a default causes a banking
crisis or viceversa has been recently studied by Borensztein and Panizza (2008). They construct
6They follow Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) in defining as a banking crisis any episode in which at
least one of the following criteria is true: (1) The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking
system exceeds 10 percent, (2) The cost of rescue operation was at least 2 percent of GDP, (3) Banking sector
problems resulted in a large scale nationalization of banks, (4) Extensive bank runs took place or emergency
measures (e.g. deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays, generalized deposit guarantees) were enacted by the
government. The mechanism highlighted in this paper is closely related to (1).
7This timing of events, with the banking crisis occuring after or at the same time as the default event is
consistent with the one we will assume in the model of the next Section, and hence the significance of documenting
that this was the timing observed in about 2/3 of the actual twin default/banking crises.
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Unconditional Prob. of a banking crisis 2.9
Prob. of banking crisis conditional on default 14.1
p-value on the test: prob(bc/def) > prob(bc) 0.0
Unconditional Prob. of a sovereign default 2.2
Prob. of default conditional on banking crisis 4.5
p-value on the test: prob(def/bc) > prob(def) 0.1
Table 2: Probabilities of Defaults and Banking Crises. From Borensztein and Panizza (2008)
an index of banking crises that includes 149 countries for the period 1975-2000. In this sample
they identify 111 banking crises (implying an unconditional probability of having a crisis equal
to 2.9%) and 85 default episodes (unconditional default probability of 2.2%). Their results are
summarized in the Table 2.
When conditioning on a sovereign default episode, the probability of a banking crisis increases
by a factor of 5 and this conditional probability is statistically significant from the unconditional
one (as denoted by a 0.0 p-value).
It can be argued that a banking crises can generate additional government spending (for
example in the form of bailouts) that would make the sovereign more prone to a default. It
is then imperative to examine the probability of having a default conditional on experiencing
a banking crisis: this probability is only 2 percentage points higher than the unconditional
probability and it is not statistically significant (at either the 1% and the 5% confidence levels)
from the unconditional one.8
Even tough these results should be taken with a grain of salt, they suggest that a default
may increase the probability of a banking crisis much more then the other way around. Overall,
the evidence presented provides support for the assumed timing in the model.
The banking sector exposure to government debt. In this section we take a look at
8A more recent empirical study on banking crises and sovereign defaults is the one by Balteanu et al. (2011).
Using the date of sovereign debt crises provided by Standard & Poor’s and the systemic banking crises identified
in Laeven and Valencia (2008) they end up with a sample containing 121 sovereign defaults and 131 banking
crises for 117 emerging and developing countries from 1975 to 2007. Among them they identify 36 ”twin crises”
(defaults and banking crises): in 17 of them a banking crisis preceded the sovereign default and in 19 the reverse
was true.
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Figure 1: Banking Sector exposure to Gov’t debt.
the degree of exposure of banks to government debt.9 To do this we follow Kumhof and Tanner
(2005) and define an exposure ratio in the following way:
Financial Institutions’ net credit to the gov’t
Financial Institutions’ net total assets
As Figure 1 documents, this exposure ratio averages 30% for emerging economies. What is even
more compelling is that for countries that actually defaulted (like Russia and Pakistan) this
percentage was even higher.
Crises episodes are episodes of decreased output and credit. It has been documented
that output falls sharply in the event of a sovereign default (see for example Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2005)). Figure 2 makes the same point in a visual way. We observe a v-shape
behavior of GDP in the temporal vicinity of defaults.
Default and banking crises are also characterized by decreased credit to the private sector.
To document this fact we use the Financial Structure Dataset constructed by Beck et al. (2009)
9Between 2001 and 2002 in Argentina, considerations on the harm the banking system would take were in
the front row of the discussions that eventually lead to the default decision. See Perry and Serve´n (2003) and
Kumhof (2004).
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Output Costs of Defaults after 1970
(Real GDP. T-3 = 100)
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Figure 2: Costly Defaults and Banking Crises.
to look at the behavior of Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions
around defaults and banking crises. Figure 3 plots this measure as a percentage of GDP and
shows that when a default comes private credit shrinks and remains reduced for the subsequent
periods.
To summarize the set of facts just reviewed: (1) Default and Banking crises tend to happen
together (with 64% of banking crises happening together with or right after a default), (2) the
banking sector is highly exposed to government debt (with emerging economies banking sector
holding on average 30% of their assets in government bonds), and (3) crises episodes are episodes
of decreased output and credit.
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Private Credit around Defaults
(as % of GDP.  t-3=100)
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Figure 3: Private Credit.
3 Environment
We analyze a closed economy under discrete time. There are four players in this economy:
households, firms, bankers, and a (benevolent) government. In this framework the households do
not have any intertemporal choice so they only make two decisions: how much to consume and
how much to work (i.e., this is just a consumption/leisure problem from the households’ point
of view). The production in the economy is conducted by standard neoclassical firms that face
only a working capital constraint: they need to pay a fraction of the wage bill up-front, hence
their need for external financing.
The bankers lend to both firms and government from a pool of funds available to them each
period. These bankers start the period with two assets: A and b. A represents an exogenous
endowment that the bankers receive every period.10 b represents the level of sovereign debt owned
10There are a number of ways to interpret this endowment A. One alternative is to model deposits dynamics,
then A is composed of fresh deposits received by the bankers in period t. An alternative interpretation is that
bankers are part of the household, and they are the only ones capable of conducting financial transactions, then
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Figure 4: Timing of events.
by the bank at the beginning of the period (this was optimally chosen in the previous period).
Finally, the government is a benevolent one (i.e., it tries to maximize the residents’ utility).
It faces a stream of spending that must be financed and it has three instruments to do so: labor
income taxation, borrowing, and default. We do not assume any kind of commitment technology
available to the government: this means that every period the government can default on its
debt. This default decision is taken at the beginning of the period and influences the rest of the
economic decisions. Therefore the following subsections examine how this economy works under
both default and no-default, and ultimately how the sovereign optimally chooses its tax, debt,
and default policies.
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3.1 Timing of events
The timing of events for a government that starts period t in good credit standing (i.e., not
excluded from the credit market) is illustrated in Figure 4 and it proceeds as follows:
• Period t arrives:
1. zt (the TFP shock) is observed.
2. Given that the government is not excluded from the credit market the pay-off relevant
state variables are the level of debt and the level of the TFP shock: (bt, zt). We are
in node A
3. The government makes the default decision: dt ∈ {0, 1}
(a) if default is chosen (dt = 1) we move to the lower branch of the tree and the
following happens:
i. government gets excluded and the credit market consists of only the (intra-
period) loan market: firms borrow to meet the working capital constraint and
bankers lend (ls) up to the level of their endowment (A).
ii. firms repay principal plus interests (ls(1 + r)) and all other markets (labor
and goods) clear.
iii. taxation (τ) and consumption take place.
iv. at the end of period t a re-access lottery is played: with probability φ the
government will re-access next period and get a fresh start (b′ = 0) and with
probability 1 − φ the government will remain excluded and will start next
period in node B .
(b) if repayment is chosen (dt = 0) we move to the upper branch of the tree and the
following happens:
it is optimal for the household (at the beginning of the period) to give this endowment A to the members of
the household that will use it better: the bankers. Yet another interpretation is to think of the bankers as
”international banks”: A represents the flow of funds from the parent bank to its subsidiary.
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i. the credit market now consists of two markets: the market for working capital
loans to firms and the market for government bonds. The bankers serve first
the domestic market (ls) up to the sum of their endowment and the repayed
government debt they own (A+ b).
ii. firms repay principal plus interests (ls(1 + r)) and the (intra-period) working-
capital loan market closes.
iii. bankers now serve the sovereign bond’s market. Each bond is traded at a
price of q and bankers can lend (qb′) only up to the total of their resources
(lsr + A+ b).
iv. all other markets (labor and goods) clear, and taxation and consumption take
place.
• Period t+1 arrives
3.2 Decision problems
In this section we describe the problems faced by each of the four economic agents in the economy.
The variable d stands for the default decision and can take only two values: 0 (no default) or 1
(default).
3.2.1 Households’ problem
As indicated above, the only decisions of the households are the labor supply and consumption
levels. Therefore, the problem faced by the households can be expressed as:
max
{ct,nt}∞0
∑
βtU(ct, nt) (1)
s.t. ct +m = (1− τt)wtnt + ΠFt (2)
where ct stands for consumption, nt denotes labor supply, wt is the wage rate, τt is the labor-
income tax rate, ΠFt represents the firm’s profits, and m is a constant spending aiming to capture
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the sum of investment and net exports.11
Plugging equation (2) into equation (1) the household’s problem can be rewritten as:
max
{nt}∞0
∑
βtU((1− τt)wtnt + ΠFt −m,nt)
and the period-t FOC reads as:
Uc (1− τt)wt + Un = 0 (3)
Equation (3) can be rearranged into the familiar expression equating the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption to the after-tax wage rate:
−Un
Uc
= (1− τt)wt (4)
3.2.2 Firms’ problem
The firms in this economy demand labor to produce the consumption good. They face a working
capital constraint that requires them to pay up-front a certain fraction of the wages bill. In order
to do so, firms will take intra-period loans from the bankers. Given these features, the firms’
problem can be expressed as:
max
Nt,ldt
ΠFt = ztF (Nt)− wtNt + ldt − (1 + rt)ldt (5)
s.t. γwtNt ≤ ldt (6)
where z is an aggregate technology shock, F (N) is the production function, ldt is the demand
for working capital loans, rt is the rate charged for the loan, and γ is the fraction of the wages
bill that must be paid up-front.
The working capital constraint is captured by equation (6). This equation will always hold
with equality because firms do not need loans for anything else than paying γwtNt, therefore any
11The constant m is only added for calibration purposes so that the model can correctly match the consumption-
to-output ratio.
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borrowing over and above γwtNt would be sub-optimal. Taking this into account and plugging
the constraint into the objective function we obtain:
max
Nt
ΠFt = ztF (Nt)− (1 + γrt)wtNt
The period-t FOC is:
ztFN = (1 + γrt)wt (7)
Condition (7) equates the marginal product of labor to the marginal cost of hiring labor once
the financial cost is factored in. Therefore, the optimality conditions from the firm’s problem are
equation (7) and equation (6) evaluated with equality.
3.2.3 Bankers’ problem
Every period the bankers participate in two different credit markets: the loans market and the
sovereign bonds markets. The working assumption is that they participate in these markets
sequentially.12
The problem of bankers can be written in recursive form as:
W (b, z) = max
x,ls,b′
v(x) + δEW (b′, z′) (8)
s.t. x = A+ (1− d)b+ lsr − (1− d)qb′ (9)
A+ (1− d)b ≥ ls (10)
where ls stands for working capital loans supply, b
′ represents government bonds demand, A
is the bankers’ endowment, r is the interest rate on the working capital loans, and q is the price
per sovereign bond.
v(x) is the period return function of the banker, x is the end-of-period consumption of the
banker, δ stands for the discount factor.
Equation (10) captures the implicit timing of the banking sector: the maximum the banker
can lend to the firms is the sum of his endowment and the repayment of government debt.
12The assumption of sequential banking is no different from the day-market/ night-market or the decentralized-
market/ centralized-market assumption commonly used in the money-search literature (see Lagos and Wright
(2005)).
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This problem can be rewritten as:
W (b, z) = max
ls,b′,µ
v(A+ (1− d)b+ lsr − (1− d)qb′) + δEW (b′, z′) + µ[A+ (1− d)b− ls]
Assuming differentiability of W (b, z), the first-order conditions are:
ls : v
′(x)r − µ = 0 (11)
b′ : − v′(x)q(1− d) + δEWb(b′, z′) = 0 (12)
µ : A+ (1− d)b− ls ≥ 0 & µ[A+ (1− d)b− ls] = 0 (13)
The envelope condition reads as:
Wb(b, z) = v
′(x)(1− d) + µ(1− d) (14)
Then, rearranging equation (11) we get:
r =
µ
v′(x)
(15)
Combining equations (12), (14) updated one period, and (15), and focusing on the case of
d = 0 (when government is not excluded and debt is actually traded) we get:
q = δE
{
v′(x′)
v′(x)
(1− d′)(1 + r′)
}
(16)
To interpret this optimality condition, define the Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) of the
banker as:
δE
{
v′(x′)
v′(x)
}
≡ Λ = SDF (17)
and re-write the next period’s payoff of the sovereign bond as:
ϑ′ = (1− d′)(1 + r′) (18)
This expression shows that in case of default (d′ = 1) the lender not only losses his investment
in sovereign bonds but also losses the future gains that those bonds would have created had them
been repaid, which are summarized in r′.
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Combining (16), (17), and (18) we obtain this standard asset-pricing equation:
q =
 E{Λϑ′} if d = 00 if d = 1 (19)
This equation is the condition pinning down the price of debt subject to default risk in this
model. In standard sovereign default models with risk neutral foreign lenders, Λ is replaced
with the (inverse of the) world’s risk free rate, which represents the lenders’ opportunity cost of
funds. In contrast, here domestic bankers arbitrage the price of today’s debt against the expected
marginal benefit of further lending.
3.2.4 Government Budget Constraint
The government needs to tax labor income to pay for both the exogenous spending and (in case
it decides not to default) the debt obligations . Its budget constraint can be expressed as:
g + (1− dt)Bt = τtwtnt + (1− dt)Bt+1qt (20)
where Bt stands for debt (with positive values meaning higher indebtness), g is the exogenous
government spending, τt is the labor income tax-rate, wt is the wage rate, and nt stands for labor.
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium given Government Policies
Definition 1 A Competitive Equilibrium given Government Policies is a sequence of alloca-
tions {ct, xt, nt, Nt, ldt , lst , bt+1}∞t=0 and prices {rt, wt,ΠFt }∞t=0 such that given sovereign bond prices
{qt}∞t=0, government policies {τt, dt, Bt}∞t=0, and shocks {m, g, zt}∞t=0 the following holds:
1. {ct, nt}∞t=0 solve the households’ problem in (1) - (2).
2. {Nt, ldt }∞t=0 solve the firm’s problem in (5) - (6).
3. {xt, lst , bt+1}∞t=0 solve the banker’s problem in (8) - (10).
4. Markets clear:
nt = Nt, bt = Bt, l
d
t = l
s
t
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Figure 5: Loan Market in period t.
and the Aggregate Resources Constraint holds:
ct + xt + g +m = zF (nt) + A
3.3.1 Loan Market Characterization
The main mechanism of the model is to highlight how a sovereign default generates a credit
crunch, which in turn shows up as an increase in the borrowing costs for the corporate sector
(firms) and a subsequently economic slowdown.
This mechanism puts the financial sector in the spotlight and Figure 5 shows how the private
credit market reacts to a sovereign default. Both the demand for loans and the supply for loans
can be obtained from the partial equilibrium conditions coming from the firms’ and bankers’
optimization problems.
Given that the working capital loan is always risk free (because firms are assumed to never
default on the loans) the bankers are going to supply inelastically the maximum amount they
can. This inelastic supply curve is affected by a default: when the government defaults, bankers’
holdings of government debt become non-performing and therefore they cannot be used in the
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private credit market. This is graphed as a shift to left of the Ls curve Figure 5. All this ends
up in firms facing higher borrowing costs: r∗d > r
∗. The planner (whose problem is defined in
the following subsection) takes into account how a default will disrupt this market.
3.4 Determination of Government Policies
We focus on Markov-Perfect equilibria where government policies are functions of pay-off relevant
state variables: the level of public debt and the technological shock.
The benevolent planer wants to maximize the welfare of the residents. To do so it has three
policy tools: taxation, debt and default; but it is subject to two constraints: (1) the allocations
that emerge from the government policies should represent a competitive equilibrium, and (2)
the government budget constraint must hold.
The optimization problem of the government can be recursively written as:
V(b, z) = max
d∈{0,1}
(1− d)Vnd + dVd (21)
Given that there are two kind of residents (households and bankers) the overall objective
function of the planner is a convex combination of the value functions of these two residents.
Then:
V i(b, z) = θV i(b, z) + (1− θ)W i(b, z)
where i = d, nd and θ is the weight assigned to the households’ happiness in the planner’s
objective function. The parameter θ gives the model certain flexibility. Letting θ be equal to
one, implies that the planner will not take into account the welfare of bankers, putting the
environment closer to the traditional Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) approach, where the lenders
are foreigners and therefore no part of the planners objective function. Moving θ to zero implies
that the planner will only care about bankers.
Following (8) W i(b, z) represents the banker’s value function. The household’s value function,
on the other hand, is defined as: V i = U(c, n) + βEV i(b′, z′).
Therefore, the value of no default is:
Vnd(b, z) = max
n,c,b′,x
{
θV nd(b, z) + (1− θ)W nd(b, z)}
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subject to:
V nd(b, z) = U(c, n) + βEV nd(b′, z′)
W nd(b, z) = v(x) + δEW nd(b′, z′)
g + b = τwn+ b′q (gov’t b.c.)
c+ x+ g +m = zF (n) + A (resources const.)
x = (A+ b)(1 + r)− qb′
r = znFN
b+A
− 1
γ
−Un
Uc
= (1− τ)w
w = zFN
(1+γr)
q = δE
{
v′(x′)
v′(x) (1− d′)(1 + r′)
}

(comp. eq. conditions)
Rewriting the constraints in terms of allocations only we obtain:
V nd(b, z) = U(c, n) + βEV nd(b′, z′)
W nd(b, z) = v(x) + δEW nd(b′, z′)
g + b =
znFN
(1 + γr∗)
+
Un(c, n)n
Uc(c, n)
+ b′q∗
c+ x+ g +m = zF (K,n) + A
x = (A+ b)(1 + r∗)− b′q∗
where
r∗ =
znFN
b+ A
− 1
γ
q∗ = δE
{
v′(x′)
v′(x)
(1− d′)(1 + r′)
}
V nd and W nd represent the values of the household and the banker under no-default, respec-
tively.
In case the sovereign decides to default it gets excluded from the credit market in that period.
There is a probability φ that the government will regain access to the financial market in which
case its debt is forgiven (i.e. it gets a fresh start). Then, the value of default can be written as:
Vd(z) = max
n,c,x
{
θV d(z) + (1− θ)W d(z)}
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subject to:
V d(z) = U(c, n) + βE
{
φV nd(0, z′) + (1− φ)V d(z′)}
W d(z) = v(x) + δE
{
φW nd(0, z′) + (1− φ)W d(z′)}
g = τwn (gov’t b.c.)
c+ x+ g +m = zF (n) + A (resources const.)
x = A(1 + r)
r = znFN
A
− 1
γ
−Un
Uc
= (1− τ)w
w = zFN
(1+γr)

(comp. eq. conditions)
3.4.1 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 2 The Markov Perfect Equilibrium for this economy is (i) a borrowing rule b′(b, z)
and a default rule d(b, z) with associated value functions {V(b, z),Vnd(b, z),Vd(z)}, consump-
tion(s) and labor plans {c(b, z), x(b, z), n(b, z)} and taxation rule τ(b, z), (ii) an equilibrium pric-
ing function for the sovereign bond q(b′; b, z), such that:
1. Given the price q(b′; b, z), the borrowing and default rules solve the sovereign’s maximization
problem in (21)
2. Given the price q(b′; b, z) and the borrowing and default rules; the consumption and labor
plans {c(b, z), x(b, z), n(b, z)} are consistent with competitive equilibrium.
3. Given the price q(b′; b, z) and the borrowing and default rules; the taxation rule τ(b, z)
satisfies the government budget constraint.
4. The price equilibrium function satisfies equation (19)
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4 Quantitative Findings
4.1 Functional Forms and Stochastic Processes
The period utility function of the households is:
U(c, n) =
(
c− nω
ω
)1−σc
1− σc
The above preferences (called GHH after Greenwood et al. (1988)) have been traditionally
used in the Small Open Economy - Real Business Cycle literature.13 These preferences shut-off
the wealth effect on labor supply and therefore help avoiding the potentially undesirable effect
of having a counter-factual increase in output on default periods.14
The return function of the bankers is:
v(x) =
x1−σb
1− σb
The production function available to the firms is:
F (N) = Nα
The only source of exogenous uncertainty in this economy is a productivity shock zt. This
shock follows an AR(1) process:
log zt = ρ log zt−1 + εt
where εt is an i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
z).
4.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated at an annual frequency using data for Argentina for the period 1980-2005.
Table 3 contains the parameter values.
13See, for example, Mendoza (1991).
14Using GHH preferences the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor does not depend
on consumption, and therefore the labor supply is not affected by wealth effects. For a related analysis about
how important are GHH preferences in generating output drops in the Sudden Stops literature, see Chakraborty
(2009).
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Curvature of labor disutility ω 2.5 Frisch wage elasticity
Labor share in output α 0.70 Standard value
Household risk aversion σc 2 Standard value
Banker risk aversion σb 0 Risk-Neutral bankers
Probability of redemption φ 0.50 Mean exclusion spell
Government Spending g 0.15 Gov’t Spending/GDP = 20%
Investment + Net Exports m 0.075 (I + NX )/GDP = 10%
Banker’s discount factor δ 0.96 Standard value RBC
Working capital requirement γ 0.51 Wages bill/Private credit = 51%
Weight of hh. in planner’s obj. function θ 0.5 Equal weight
Household’s discount factor β 0.80 Mean Debt/ output =˜ 16%
Banker’s endowment A 0.2 Mean exposure ratio =˜ 35%
TFP autocorrelation coefficient ρ 0.90 GDP autocorrelation
Std. dev. of innovations σz 2.7% GDP std. dev.
Table 3: Benchmark Calibration.
The parameters above the line are set to independently match moments from the data or
are parameters that take common values in the literature. The labor share in output (α) and
the risk aversion parameter for the households (σc) are set to 0.7 and 2 respectively, which are
standard values in the quantitative macroeconomics literature. Banker’s risk aversion σb is set
to zero to feature risk-neutral bankers. The value of the exogenous spending level g is set up
to 0.15 to match the ratio of General Government Expenditures to GDP for Argentina in the
period 1985-2000 of 20% (from World Bank’s World Development Indicators). Parameter m is
meant to capture the level of investment (I) plus net exports (NX) and it is set to 0.075 so that
the ratio (I+NX)/GDP generated by the model is equal to the observed ratio, 10%. The working
capital requirement parameter (γ) is taken directly from the Argentine data. In the model γ is
equal to the ratio of private credit to wage payments, the data shows that for Argentina this
ratio was 51% (for the period 1993-2001).15
The discount factor for the bankers (i.e., the lenders) takes a usual value in RBC models with
15In order to construct this ratio we took data for Private Credit from IMF’s International Financial Statistics,
and data for Total Wage-Earners Remuneration from INDEC (Argentina’s Census and Statistics Office).
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annual frequency, 0.96. It is important to realize that the exact value of δ is not crucial in itself
but in how it compares with the household’s discount factor (discussed below). The weight that
households’ utility receives on the planner’s overall objective function (θ) is set in the benchmark
calibration to 0.5 in order to give all the residents (bankers and households) the same weight.
It is crucial to see that if θ takes the value of one, then the model features ’international banks’
and hence facilitates the comparison with previous literature that focused on external debt and
default: this is exercise is done as part of a sensitivity analysis, later in the manuscript.16
There are two more above the line parameters to discuss: the curvature of labor disutility (ω)
and the probability of redemption (φ). The value of ω is typically chosen to match empirical evi-
dence on the Frisch wage elasticity, 1/(ω−1). The estimates for this elasticity vary considerably:
Greenwood et al. (1988) cite estimates from previous studies ranging from 0.3 to 2.2, Gonza´lez
and Sala Lorda (2011) find estimates from −13.1 to 12.8 for Mercosur countries. Here we take
ω = 2.5 as the benchmark scenario (implying a Frisch wage elasticity of 0.67) and conduct some
sensitivity analysis later.
The probability of redemption is governed by the parameter φ. The evidence collected by
Gelos et al. (2004) is that emerging economies remain excluded on average 4 years after a default.
This finding applies only to external defaults. It can be argued that governments have a additional
mechanisms (regulatory measures, moral suasion, etc.) to place their debt in domestic markets
making the domestic exclusion shorter than the external exclusion. Therefore the benchmark
calibration will be φ = 0.5, which given the annual calibration implies a mean exclusion of 2
years. Alternative values for φ are considered in the sensitivity analysis section.
The parameters below the line {β,A, ρ , σz} are simultaneously determined in order to match
a set of meaningful moments of the data. The moments matched by the model are all taken from
Argentine data and they are the mean domestic debt to output ratio, the mean exposure of the
banking sector to government debt, and the autocorrelation and standard deviation of GDP.
Given that the model features both a closed economy the correct debt-to-output ratio to
16Setting θ = 1 features international banks but does not make our model collapse to the ones in Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). The reason is very clear: in our model these international banks are not
deep-pocket, but are only able to lend up to A+ (1− d)b.
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match is the Domestic Debt to GDP. To do so I take the ratio of Total Debt to Output from
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and extract only the Domestic Debt part of it by using the share of
Domestic Debt to Total Debt form Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).
TD
Y︸︷︷︸
from Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
× DD
TD︸︷︷︸
from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)
=
DD
Y︸︷︷︸
relevant debt ratio
This exercise gives a mean Domestic Debt to GDP ratio of 16.5% for the period 1980-2002.
As it was documented in section 2 the banking sector of virtually every emerging economy is
highly exposed to government debt. The mean exposure ratio (defined in section 2) for Argentina
was approximately 25%.
The autocorrelation and standard deviation of Argentine GDP were computed at an annual
frequency from the time series available from INDEC (the Argentine Census and Statistics Office)
for the period 1980-2005. The autocorrelation of the cyclical component of GDP is 0.28 and the
standard deviation is 4.11%.17
4.3 Results
This section examines the performance of the benchmark calibration of the model in accounting
for some key statistical moments of business cycles and government debt. Table 4 reports the
moments from the simulations of the model and compares them with the moments from Argentine
data.
Overall the benchmark calibration of the model is able to account for several salient facts
of the Argentine economy, namely a ratio of consumption volatility to output volatility grater
than 1, countercyclical sovereign spreads, and a high and positive correlation between output
and consumption.18 All of these moments were not targeted by the calibration process and
are reproduced by the model. The benchmark calibration also captures nicely the negative
correlation between employment and sovereign spreads, as well as procyclical employment.
17The series obtained from INDEC is real GDP, and it was first logged and then H-P filtered using a smoothing
parameter of 6.25 (as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002)).
18These facts also characterize many other emerging economies, as documented in Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
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Data Model
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.17 1.82
σ(n)/σ(y) 0.57 0.94
corr(Rs, y) -0.62 -0.81
corr(c, y) 0.97 0.99
corr(N, y) 0.52 0.99
corr(Rs, N) -0.58 -0.77
Mean output drop 9.40% 8.23%
Mean credit drop 27.09% 8.17%
Default rate 2.56% 1.60%
Mean debt/ output 16.5% 16.84%
Gov’t Spending/ output 20% 19.75%
Mean Exposure Ratio 36% 36.12%
Table 4: Simulated Moments and Data. Rs stands for bond’s spread. The data for sovereign spreads is
taken from J.P. Morgan’s EMBI, which represents the difference in yields between an Argentine bond
and a US bond of similar maturity. The spreads generated by the model are the difference between the
the interest rate paid by the government and the one paid by the private sector.
The model does well at replicating the mean output drop. Data from INDEC indicates that in
the recent Argentine default episode GDP fell 9.4 percentage points from trend. The benchmark
calibration delivers an average decrease of 8.23 percent. The sovereign default triggers a credit
crunch in the model and it in turn generates an output collapse. This collapse is due to a
reduced access to the labor input, which is the only variable input in the economy. The fact that
the economy cannot resort to a substitute input generates a sharp output decline. It is again
important to remark that the mean output drop was not among the targeted moments in the
calibration procedure.
The credit drop that drives the endogenous cost of default is a novel contribution of our
analysis. The benchmark calibration of the model is able to produce a mean credit drop of 8.17%
which accounts for 30% of the actual credit drop observed in the 2001-02 Argentine default.
The model does not do well in terms of matching the mean default rate, but this deserves
further consideration. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) Argentina has defaulted on its
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Figure 6: Output around defaults.
domestic debt 5 times since its independence in 1816, implying a default probability of 2.5%.
It is typical in quantitative studies of sovereign default to calibrate the models to the observed
frequency of default. Other models in the literature when calibrated to obtain the observed
default frequency usually do poorly in some key dimensions, like the mean debt ratio.
4.3.1 Output dynamics around defaults
An important result of the paper is to provide a framework able to deliver endogenous output
declines in default periods. Figure 4 is constructed from the model simulations in the following
way: first, we identify the simulation periods where default happens; second, we construct a time
series of 8 years before and 3 years after each default; third, we average across default episodes
27
Figure 7: Credit crunch.
to construct a series of the mean output behavior around defaults.
As it is clear from Figure 6 the model features an output decline (and a consequent con-
sumption decline) in the default period. The model is also able to deliver a v-shape behavior of
output around defaults: a strategic default is the optimal crisis resolution mechanism - - due to
worsening economic conditions, the sovereign finds it optimal to default on its obligations (and
assume the associated costs) instead of increasing the revenues required for repayment.
4.3.2 Endogenous cost of default: Credit contraction
Why does a default generate such a costly output decline? This paper proposes a credit crunch
explanation: given that bankers hold government debt as part of their assets, when a default
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comes a considerable fraction of these assets losses value, therefore their lending ability contracts
and as a consequence credit to the private sector diminishes. Given that the productive sector
is in need of external financing, a credit crunch translates into an output decline.19
Figure 7 shows how a credit crunch looks in the model. The benchmark parametrization of
the model is able to produce a collapse in the private sector credit (i.e., working capital loans to
firms, in the model).
Figure 7 also shows how the exclusion from the credit market affects the credit availability
and consequently output. In the top panels of this figure we can see the workings of a credit
crunch: firms are in need of external financing, therefore when loanable funds shrink, output
shrinks with them.
We can also see the effect of exclusion from financial markets: if the government remains
excluded then the private credit reduces (and remains low) and the output decline becomes more
protracted. On the other hand, an immediate re-access to the credit market implies a rapid
recovery in both credit and output.
Compared to the behavior observed in the data (i.e. Figure 3 in Section 2) the model is
unable to generate any persistence. An interesting extension is to allow the bankers endowment
A to be endogenously chosen: in this way bad states of the nature (where default will sometimes
happen) give little incentive to build-up A. When a default hits, then there is even less incen-
tives to accumulate A and this (possibly coupled with longer exclusion spells for the defaulting
government) leads to lower private credit after a default.
4.3.3 Benefit of defaults: reduced taxation
As argued in the introduction, the optimal default decision comes from balancing costs and
benefits of defaults. The costs of default were already discussed above: output declines because
of a credit contraction. The benefits on the other hand come from reduced taxation. Figure 8
shows the behavior of the labor income tax rate around defaults: we plot the equilibrium tax rate
and also the ”counterfactual” tax rate that would have been necessary if instead of defaulting
19Bolton and Jeanne (2011) identify this phenomenon as banks becoming illiquid.
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Figure 8: Labor tax rate around defaults.
the government had repaid.
The reduced taxation is precisely the difference between the counterfactual repayment rate
and the equilibrium tax rate: for the benchmark calibration this difference is of 13 percentage
points on average. Appendix A shows that this rationale also goes through in a modified model
where the sovereign has access only to lump-sum (i.e. non-distortionary) taxation.
4.3.4 Sovereign bonds market
In this section we analyze the behavior of the government bonds market. To this end, we show
a set of charts that are often used in the default literature for this purpose. As discussed above,
the model performs quite well with respect to the sovereign bond market dynamics: it produces
default in bad times and (therefore) countercyclical spreads.
Figure 9 shows the equilibrium default region and the bond price function, respectively.
With respect to top panel, the white area represents the repayment area: it decreases (until it
vanishes) while the indebtness level increases and/or the level of the technology shock decreases.
The bottom panel presents the price schedule that the government faces. As it was expected,
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Figure 9: d(b, z) and q(b′; b, z).
the price the sovereign receives for each bond decreases with TFP and also with the total level
of indebtness.
Now we turn to the behavior of spreads in the run up to a default. Figure 8 shows that the
spreads generated by the model are able to mimic the behavior of the EMBI spreads in that they
are relatively flat until the year previous to a default when they spike. On the other hand the
mean spreads are higher than the observed ones away from default and lower than the data in
period before.
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Figure 10: Spreads before a default.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis to gain a better understanding of how a set of
key moments in the baseline calibration react to changes in the underlaying parameters. Table
5 summarizes the findings of this exercise.
Let’s first study how the model economy reacts to changes in the re-entry probability (φ).
If the government could re-access immediately after a default (φ = 1) then the overall costs of
a default (exclusion form credit markets are among them) are reduced. Lower costs of default
makes default a more attractive choice, so we see that for φ = 1 default is more frequent.
Consequently less debt can be sustained. If on the other hand we lower φ making re-access less
frequent then the exclusion-cost-of-default is larger and the government is able to sustain higher
debt ratios. The endogenous cost of default in this paper works through a reduction in credit
availability: the higher the debt the government defaults on, the higher the cost, and this we see
as we increase the value of φ.
Next, let’s examine how the model behaves with different values of γ. This parameter governs
the tightness of the working capital constraint, γ ∈ (0, 1]. A high (low) value of γ means that
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Moments (in %)
Default rate E{b/y} E{Rs} Exposure y ↓ Credit ↓
Data 2.5 16.50 7.43 36 9.40 27.09
Benchmark 1.60 16.84 6.17 36.12 8.23 8.17
re-entry (benchmark: φ = 0.5)
φ = 0.05 0.73 24.91 4.31 42.93 5.72 6.88
φ = 0.1 0.91 24.81 4.72 44.21 6.06 7.05
φ = 1 1.63 16.53 5.99 36.95 10.02 10.92
w-k constraint (benchmark: γ = 0.51)
γ → 0 0 0 − 0 n.a. n.a.
γ = 0.1 0 0 − 0 n.a. n.a.
γ = 0.3 2.56 0.04 6.80 0.16 −0.81 0.01
γ = 0.6 0.75 38.47 4.84 47.10 12.38 14.12
γ = 0.7 0.27 63.46 4.40 56.13 18.81 19.37
Frisch wage elasticity (benchmark: ω = 2.5)
0.5 (ω = 3) 3.51 9.52 7.57 24.32 6.84 4.46
1 (ω = 2) 1.06 36.09 5.13 49.21 9.29 14.87
Banker’s endowment (benchmark: A = 0.2)
A = 0.1 0 109.91 0 75.31 n.a. n.a.
A = 0.3 12.25 0.43 77.13 1.12 −0.35 0.10
A = 0.5 0 0 − 0 n.a. n.a.
HH weight on V(b, z) (benchmark: θ = 0.5)
θ = 0 0 39.96 0 22.22 n.a. n.a.
θ = 1 0.89 35.16 4.90 48.16 7.40 9.69
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis.
firms need to pay up front a higher (lower) ratio of their wage bill, therefore working capital
loans are more (less) important for production. We can see that the model performs as expected:
for lower values of γ (cases in which private credit is not that important for production) default
is not very costly, consequently the government feels tempted to default too much. Creditors
understand this and contract lending in the government bonds market. Therefore we see that
for values of γ → 0, the mean debt ratio is zero and then the observed default rate is also
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zero. On the other hand, high values of γ make default very costly. Consequently the observed
debt ratios are higher and the observed default rates are low. In these rare (i.e. rarer than the
benchmark) defaults, the costs in terms of output and credit drops considerable larger than in
the benchmark calibration.
When it comes to the Frisch wage elasticity (1/(ω − 1)) the behavior of the model is as
expected. A higher wage elasticity of labor supply implies that when a default comes and firms
have to decrease their labor demand (due to higher costs of financing) the decline in equilibrium
labor is greater than with a more inelastic labor supply. Therefore (as expected) for lower values
of ω (higher elasticity) the model features higher output drop at default and can sustain lager
debt ratios, and for higher values of ω the opposite is true.
Banker’s endowment A is a crucial parameter for the workings of the credit crunch. Basically
a higher level of A makes government debt less important for the private credit market. The
planner understands this and it is more tempted to default when A is larger. Lenders foresee this
behavior and refrain from lending to the government. Therefore we observe a non-monotonic
relation here: for low enough levels of A (e.g. A = 0.1) default is too painful for the firms and
therefore the government decides to never default and with this it is able to sustain large debt
ratios. Conversely, for large enough levels of A (e.g. A = 0.3) defaults are less painful for the
private credit market and therefore the government is more tempted to default (we observe larger
default rates) and it is able to sustain lower debt ratios. For even larger levels of A, everyone
understands that debt is not very important for the credit markets and that governments will
be tempted to default on it every time they have a chance, therefore nobody lends.
Finally, we examine the role of θ, the weight that households receive in the planner’s objective
function. If θ = 1 it means the planner only cares about households or (what is the same) bankers
are not residents but instead they are international banks. If this is the case we can compare the
model against other models of external sovereign debt and default. In that dimension the model
does a very good job: it obtains a reasonable default probability (0.90%) and achieves a debt to
output ratio close to the data (external debt to output in Argentina was around 36%). On the
other extreme if θ = 0, then the ”planner” only cares about the bankers and given the bankers
are the only lenders, default would never be optimal. Therefore the planner can sustain higher
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debt ratios (higher than in the benchmark calibration).
4.5 Discussion of the assumptions
The model just described made a series of simplifying assumptions in order to isolate the effect
that a sovereign default has on the banking sector and the productive sector of the economy. In
this subsection we discuss them, ways to relax them and potential implications.
Constant g: in order to make the optimal fiscal policy as simple as possible we had assumed
a constant level of government expenditure, g. While this is a useful first approximation relaxing
this assumption could improve the model’s quantitative performance. How to do it? The first
thing to do is to make g valuable: a common approach is to include g in the household’s utility
function. Then, g becomes an extra fiscal policy instrument: the planner understands that
higher g implies either higher τ or higher indebtness, but also takes into account the agents’
preference for g. Then, when a default comes and consumption declines the planner finds it
optimal to decrease g as well in order to satisfy the intratemporal optimality condition relating
private and public consumption. Therefore the model would be able to account for the observed
procyclicality of government spending.
Financial autarky: we presented a model of a closed economy where government debt is
held by domestic bankers. While this is an attractive environment to study the implications of a
sovereign default on the domestic financial sector it comes at the expense of having an unrealistic
closed capital account. If we let the government borrow form abroad as well as from the domestic
bankers then the model becomes one of domestic and external sovereign debt, a missing piece
in the quantitative literature on sovereign defaults. Nonetheless, this extension would bring
other forces into play. The possibility of selective defaults can in principle mitigate the negative
effect that a sovereign default has on the domestic economy: by defaulting on foreign lenders
the government could in principle afford to serve the domestic lenders. Allowing the private
sector to borrow form abroad as well will decrease the relevance of the domestic credit market
for domestic production. However, as long as a fraction of the domestic firms needs to borrow
from domestic sources the mechanism proposed in the model will still play an important role.
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Constant A: assuming bankers receive a constant endowment every period allows us to fix
ideas and focus on the asset side of the bankers’ balance sheet and how it responds to a sovereign
default. Relaxing this assumption is clearly a desirable step towards bringing the model closer to
the data. Allowing (for example) for deposits from the households will enrich the environment
and make it able to capture another salient feature of emerging economies crises: bank runs.
Anticipating the possibility of a sovereign default and fearing banks will not be able to fully
repay the deposits, households will run on the banks and therefore put more pressure on the
availability of loanable funds in the economy.
5 Conclusions
The prevalence of defaults and banking crises is a defining feature of emerging economies. Three
facts are noteworthy about these episodes: 1- Default and Banking crises tend to happen together
(with 64% of banking crises happening together with or right after a default), 2- the banking
sector is highly exposed to government debt (with emerging economies’ banking sector holding on
average 30% of their assets in government bonds), and 3- crises episodes are episodes of decreased
output and credit.
In this paper we have provided a rationale for this phenomena. Bankers who are exposed
to government debt suffer from a sovereign default that reduces the value of their assets (i.e. a
banking crisis). This forces these bankers to decrease the credit to the productive private sector.
This credit crunch translates in both lower and more costly financing for the productive sector,
which generates an endogenous output decline.
This paper presents a theory of the transition mechanism of sovereign defaults to the banking
sector and the rest of the economy. A methodological contribution of this paper is to present a
competing mechanism to endogenize the costs of sovereign defaults: a sovereign default generates
a credit crunch, and this credit crunch generates output declines.
The model shows an overall qualitative fit of the data (v-shape behavior of output around
defaults, credit contractions at default). On a quantitative note, several dimensions are accurately
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accounted for: countercyclicality of bond spreads, mean default rate, mean output drop.
Some avenues for future research / possible extensions are:
• Incorporating an endogenous banker’s net worth accumulation: this extension can in princi-
ple generate some persistence in the model and help to capture the time profile of domestic
credit better.
• Bank leverage and regulatory policy: banks behavior is intentionally crude in the model (at
this point simplifications are necessary to compute a rather complicated Markov Perfect
optimal policy problem) but one could think of the potential implications that regulatory
policy could have for bank leverage. If government debt (by regulation) is considered risk-
free then banks have additional incentives to hold government debt. On the other hand
a default not only decreases banks assets but also diminishes their leverage. Then the
government faces a meaningful trade-off when considering both its debt position and the
default policy.
• Endogenous government spending: making public spending valuable and letting the gov-
ernment optimally chose its level will increase the complexity of the planning problem
but could also improve the model’s ability to account for the observed procyclicality of
government expenditures.
• Political economy of sovereign defaults. A default in this model implies redistribution from
bankers (lenders) to households (taxpayers). It would be an interesting extension to study
the politico-economic equilibrium that would arise if agents were allowed to vote on the
default policies.
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